Комитет СФ по обороне поддержал закон об использовании ВС за рубежом

Профильный комитет Совета Федерации по обороне и безопасности поддержал в четверг внесенный президентом РФ законопроект об использовании вооруженных сил (ВС) РФ за пределами страны и рекомендовал верхней палате одобрить его на пленарном заседании 30 октября. Председатель комитета Виктор Озеров напомнил, что, в соответствии с документом, формирования ВС могут оперативно использоваться за пределами России для отражения вооруженного нападения на воинские формирования РФ, дислоцированные за рубежом, для отражения или предотвращения вооруженного нападения на другое государство, обратившееся к России с соответствующей просьбой, а также для защиты граждан РФ, находящихся за рубежом, от вооруженного нападения на них. "Также, в соответствии с внесенным законопроектом, формирования ВС РФ могут быть использованы в целях борьбы с пиратством", - сказал он РИА Новости.

При этом Озеров обратил внимание на то, что решение об оперативном использовании ВС принимает президент РФ на основании соответствующего постановления Совета Федерации. Именно глава государства определяет общую численность воинских формирований и срок их использования, сказал сенатор. "Мы поддерживаем этот закон, поскольку он создает полноценную правовую базу для оперативного использования российских вооруженных сил за пределами страны и способствует тем самым укреплению безопасности российского государства и российских граждан", - заявил председатель комитета. По словам Озерова, возможность использования вооруженных сил для защиты своих граждан прописана в законодательстве многих стран.

Права на данный материал принадлежат РИАНовости (29.10.2009).

Госдума рассмотрит закон о применении Вооруженных сил РФ за рубежом

Госдума в пятницу рассмотрит в третьем, окончательном чтении внесенный президентом РФ законопроект "Об обороне", касающийся оперативного использования Вооруженных сил РФ за пределами территории страны. Документ предусматривает, что формирования Вооруженных сил (ВС) России могут оперативно использоваться за пределами территории страны для отражения вооруженного нападения на формирование ВС РФ, другие войска или органы, дислоцированные за пределами России, отражения или предотвращения вооруженного нападения на другое государство, обратившееся к России с соответствующей просьбой, защиты граждан РФ, находящихся за рубежом, от вооруженного нападения на них. Формирования ВС также могут быть использованы в целях борьбы с пиратством и обеспечения безопасности судоходства. Решение об оперативном использовании Вооруженных сил принимается президентом РФ на основании соответствующего постановления Совета Федерации. Общую численность воинских формирований, район их действия, стоящие перед ними задачи и срок использования определяет глава государства. Комплектование и обеспечение указанных формирований осуществляет Минобороны РФ. Действующий закон предусматривает использование формирований ВС РФ за пределами территории страны только для решения задач по пресечению международной террористической деятельности, выполнения задач в соответствии с международными договорами РФ. Другие основания для использования российских воинских формирований за рубежом законом не предусмотрены. Но сложившаяся ситуация затрудняет оперативность подготовки и принятия соответствующих решений верховным главнокомандующим Вооруженными силами (в России им является президент) в определенных экстремальных ситуациях, например, в таких, как грузинская агрессия против Южной Осетии в августе 2008 года, что угрожает национальным интересам России, правам и законным интересам ее граждан, говорится в заключении комитета Госдумы по обороне.

Права на данный материал принадлежат РИАНовости (23.10.2009).

Who can be detained in the "War on Terror"? The Emerging Answer

ASIL Insight
October 20, 2009
Volume 13, Issue 18

By Faiza Patel

Introduction

Soon after the United States launched its “war on terror” by attacking the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, U.S. courts were asked to consider who could be detained as part of this conflict. The Supreme Court partially resolved the question in 2004 in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, holding that the government could detain individuals, including US citizens, who were part of or supporting Taliban forces and engaged in armed conflict against the US.[1] It sidestepped the broader question of the outer bounds of the category of people who could be detained as an “enemy combatant,” leaving it to the lower courts to define. Four years later, the Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush[2] cleared the way for detainees held at the U.S. Naval Facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to challenge their detention in U.S. courts – and for federal district court judges in the District of Columbia to grapple with the questions left open by Hamdi.[3]
As the Guantánamo cases were winding their way to decision, a new President took office and the government refined its position on who could be detained. The Bush administration had claimed the non-reviewable authority to detain any person it deemed an “enemy combatant” based on the inherent authority of the President as Commander in Chief and, alternatively, on Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).[4] The Obama administration dropped the label “enemy combatant.” Based on the AUMF, it claimed authority to detain those suspected of involvement in the 9/11 attacks and, more broadly:

those who were part of Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces that were engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; and

those who substantially supported Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces that were engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.[5]

In the government's view, this would cover persons who committed a belligerent act, or directly supported hostilities, in aid of enemy armed forces.

This Insight explores the main issues involved in determining the scope of the category of persons who may be detained in the “war on terror,” looking at both recently issued ICRC guidance and key cases in U.S. federal courts.

Recognition of Organized Armed Groups

In May 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a report defining direct participation in hostilities (ICRC Guidance),[6] in which it recognized for the first time that organized armed groups belonging to a party to the conflict are – like the members of a State's army – legitimate targets of military action.[7] Civilians, on the other hand, remain protected except when they directly participate in hostilities.[8] The ICRC cited to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to support this position. Common Article 3 provides that “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause” must be treated humanely.[9] The ICRC reasoned that the reference to “members of armed forces” suggested that Common Article 3 assumed that non-State parties to a conflict would have armed forces that were distinct from the civilian population. The ICRC found further support for this principle in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which recognizes the existence of “armed forces,” “dissident armed forces” and “other organized armed groups” fighting on behalf of non-State actors.[10]

The ICRC Guidance emphasizes that its purpose is only to explain who should be considered a protected civilian for purposes of targeting during hostilities. However, as is evident from the discussion below, the distinction between civilians and combatants for targeting purposes is the starting point from which U.S. courts have analyzed whether the law of war allows detention in the “war on terror.” In undertaking this analysis, U.S. courts have relied extensively on the ICRC's interpretations of the Geneva Conventions.[11] The ICRC Guidance thus provides a useful yardstick for analyzing the results reached in the Guantánamo cases.

Even though they did not take account of the ICRC Guidance, all Guantánamo cases decided thus far have found that members of organized armed groups in non-international armed conflicts are subject to detention under the laws of war. Judge Walton analyzed the issue at length in his influential opinion in Gherebi v. Obama.[12] He noted that the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi that the authorization of the use of force against enemy nations encompassed the right to detain enemy fighters as a fundamental incident of waging war. Given that the AUMF authorized the same use of force against enemy organizations, Judge Walton concluded that “it stands to reason that Congress intended to confer upon the President the same authority to detain individuals fighting on behalf of enemy organizations that it conferred on him with respect to enemy nations.”[13] He therefore held that under the AUMF the government could detain individuals fighting on behalf of enemy organizations (i.e., members of organized armed groups), as well as those fighting on behalf of enemy nations.

In considering whether this holding comported with the laws of war, Judge Walton rejected the argument that these laws supported detention as an incident of war in international armed conflicts (such as that at issue in Hamdi), but not in non-international armed conflicts (such as that at issue in Gherebi).[14] Judge Walton concluded that the Geneva Conventions did not authorize detention in either type of conflict. Rather, they pre-supposed that such detention would occur and regulated its conditions.[15]

Turning to the scope of the government's detention authority, Judge Walton rejected the argument that the Geneva Conventions recognized only two categories of people in non-international armed conflict: members of the State's armed forces and civilians (with the latter permissibly subject to attack only when directly participating in hostilities). Like the ICRC, Judge Walton relied upon Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to recognize a third category: the “armed forces” of non-State actors who are actively participating in hostilities. He further held that, because Common Article 3 required a State to treat humanely “members of armed forces...placed hors de combat by...detention,” it implied that the State could detain such persons.[16]

A month later, in Hamlily v. Obama, Judge Bates canvassed the laws of war and reached a similar conclusion.[17] These two cases have been enormously influential and have been followed by several judges in reviewing later cases.[18]

Chain of Command v. Combat Function

Several Guantánamo cases have held that a person who takes orders from an al-Qaeda or Taliban command is a member of one of those groups and can be detained. In Gherebi, the court held that the key question was “whether an individual ‘receive[s] and execute[s] orders' from the enemy force's combat apparatus, not whether he is an al-Qaeda fighter.”[19] It further held that an al-Qaeda member whose job was to house, feed or transport fighters could be detained as part of the enemy armed forces regardless of his involvement in actual fighting. On the other hand, an al-Qaeda doctor or cleric, or the father of an al-Qaeda fighter who sheltered his son out of familial loyalty, could not be detained.[20] The Guantánamo cases that have not followed this approach have also accepted that a person's support of al-Qaeda or the Taliban would be a sufficient basis for detention (see discussion below).[21] They have therefore not examined the criteria for membership in an armed group, but have instead looked broadly at the individual's behavior vis-à-vis the relevant armed group.[22]

Both approaches clash with the ICRC's position that organized armed groups “consist[] only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities.”[23] Under the ICRC's view, persons who perform political and administrative functions, individuals who accompany or support armed groups, but whose function is not direct participation in hostilities (e.g., recruiters, trainers, financiers, propagandists), weapons support specialists and those who collect intelligence would not be considered as members of an armed group. Many of these people would, however, fall within US courts' definition of members of an armed group.

Substantial Support

Perhaps the most controversial element of the detention authority claimed by the U.S. is the right to detain those who “substantially supported” enemy forces. While some Guantánamo cases have unquestioningly accepted this standard, several have indicated deep discomfort with importing what is essentially a domestic criminal law standard into the law of war. i explicitly rejected detention on the basis of substantial support.[24] Gherebi defined the problem away. It accepted the “substantial support” standard, but interpreted it as equivalent with being “part of” the “armed forces” of an enemy organization.[25] Two additional judges have adopted the Hamlily approach and rejected “substantial support” as a basis for detention.[26]

Although the ICRC did not address the issue of “substantial support,” the concept appears to be at odds with its limited definition of “armed groups.” Also, the ICRC has emphasized that only the armed forces of a non-State party – and not the political and administrative apparatus of the non-State party – are subject to military action.[27] This distinction would be undermined if “substantial support” of al-Qaeda or the Taliban was considered as sufficient to allow detention under the AUMF.

Conclusion

The Guantánamo cases present an interesting microcosm for studying the development of the laws of war, as applied in the context of the “war on terror.” The recognition of “organized armed groups” as permissible objects of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts by both the ICRC and U.S. courts is an important step forward in the clarification of the law. On the other hand, as demonstrated above, there are some fundamental inconsistencies in approach amongst the decisions rendered thus far. There are also questions as to whether these decisions are consistent with applicable international law.

The extension to non-international armed conflicts of the detention power recognized in Hamdi for inter-State conflicts is an area in which there could be a divergence between the two regimes. Although the Gherebi and Hamlily courts provided convincing arguments for the proposition that the Geneva Conventions did not authorize detention in any type of conflict but that detention was simply a normal incident of inter-State conflict, they did not fully address whether detention in a non-international armed conflict was authorized as an incident of war rather than under domestic law (for example, by examining state practice). Such analysis would seem to be required by the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi, which interpreted the authorization to use force to encompass detention authority based on “longstanding law-of-war principles.”[28] The Hamdi Court explicitly cautioned that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those that informed the development of the law of war that understanding may unravel.”[29] The non-international aspects of the “war on terror” undoubtedly present practical circumstances that are very different from the context in which the laws of war evolved. In particular, the geographical and temporal boundaries of the conflict are so much more malleable than those of all previous wars that there is ample room for appellate courts to come to a different view than that taken thus far in the Guantánamo cases.

The differences between the ICRC and U.S. courts on how to determine who is “part of” an armed group are also striking. The ICRC model is narrower than even the narrowest model adopted by the U.S. courts. This discrepancy may be explained by the timing of the issuance of the ICRC Guidance. More importantly, the ICRC's “continuous combat function” model was developed for purposes of distinguishing who is a combatant in the conduct of hostilities, and perhaps membership in an organized armed group would be construed more widely in the context of detention. At the same time, U.S. courts have consistently relied on Geneva Convention principles of distinction – which apply to targeting – for understanding who can be detained in the “war on terror,” and have been respectful of the ICRC's views on this question. This suggests that, at the very least, the ICRC Guidance should inform the analysis of detention authority in future decisions.

Although progress in this complex area has been slow, the decisions already rendered in the Guantánamo cases reveal the outlines of the categories of people who, at least according to domestic US law, can be detained in the “war on terror.” As these cases make their way through the appellate process, these outlines will no doubt become clearer.

About the Author

Faiza Patel, an ASIL member, is an attorney in the Liberty and National Security Project at the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law.

Endnotes

[1] Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
[2] Boumediene v. Bush, _US_, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262, 171 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2008).
[3] The Guantánamo habeas cases have all been brought before the federal district courts of the District of Columbia.
[4] Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, SS 1-2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
[5] See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2009). In addition to dropping the label “enemy combatant,” the principal change made by the Obama Administration was to add the qualifier “substantially.”
[6] International Committee for the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-report_res/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-icrc.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter ICRC Guidance].
[7] Id. at 27. The “organized armed groups” recognized by the ICRC are exclusively “the armed or military wing of a non-State party: its armed forces in a functional sense.” Id. at 32. Other types of affiliation or support for a non-State party to a conflict would not lead to membership of an organized armed group.
[8] Id.
[9] Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (emphasis added); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 286 (same).
[10] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
[11] Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 63-67; Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2009). In Hamlily, the District Court specifically noted, as part of its consideration of the detention issue that the ICRC had stated that the definition of “direct participation in hostilities” was unsettled. Id. at 74, n.14. See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 619, n.48 (noting that the ICRC is “referred to by name in several provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions” and that, “[t]hough not binding law,” its commentary on the Geneva Conventions is, “as the parties recognize, relevant in interpreting the Conventions' provisions”).
[12] Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
[13] Id.
[14] It had been argued by petitioner Khan that the conflict between the United States and the Taliban government, which was at issue in Hamdi was international, while the conflict between the United States and organizations like Al Qaeda was non-international. Id. at 56. The court did not take a position on the character of the conflict. Id. at 55, n.7, but rather rejected the idea that the difference in the character of the conflict was relevant for purposes of deciding who could be detained under the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 60-61.
[15] Id. at 61.
[16] Id. at 65.
[17] Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74 .
[18] See Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Mutairi v. United States, No. 02-828, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 66868, at *17 (D.D.C. July 29, 2009); Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-828, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 78222, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009); Al Rabiah v. United States, No. 02-828, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 88936, at *18-19 (D.D.C. Sep. 17, 2009). Judge Leon of the D.C. District Court has followed a different approach. He decided the first of the Guantánamo cases before the government revised its proposed standard. At that time, he accepted the standard applied in the Combatant Status Review Tribunals under the Military Commissions Act of 2004. Under this view, an enemy combatant subject to detention was “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Boumedienne v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008). He has continued to follow this approach, which is not dissimilar from the one proposed by the US government. Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Bihani v. Bush, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240, 243 (D.D.C. 2009). One judge of the D.C. District Court, Judge Kessler, has accepted, without discussion, the government's proposed standard. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2009).
[19] Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69; accord Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75; Al Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (adopting Hamlily); Al Odah, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 78222, at *14. See also Al Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35 (upholding detention of a cook in the 55th Arab Brigade because he followed orders of al-Qaeda commander).
[20] See Hamlily, 616 F.Supp.2d at 75; Al Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (adopting Hamlily); Al Odah, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 78222, at *14. See also Al Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35.
[21] Al Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (adopting Hamlily); Al Odah, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 78222 at *14. See also Al Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35.
[22] See Gharani, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 147-149; Hammamy, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 243-244; Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 59-66.
[23] ICRC Guidance, supra note 6, at 33.
[24] Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 76. Since Hamlily rejected the substantial support standard, it also rejected the government's view that persons who directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces were subject to detention under the laws of war.
[25] Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
[26] Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26; Al Mutairi, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 66868, at *17-18; Al Odah, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 78222, at *16; Al Rabiah, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 88936, at *18-19. On the other hand, as discussed previously, see, supra note 17, Judge Leon has adopted the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, which includes the concept of support.
[27] ICRC Guidance, supra note 6, at 32.
[28] Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 594.
[29] Id.

Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (September 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 500 pages)

The Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, established by a decision of the Council of the European Union on December 2, 2008, has issued its final report concluding that the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia was in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. The report, which is meant to “[i]nvestigate the origins and the course of the conflict in Georgia,” gives a brief but telling overview of the internal and international elements that led to the shelling of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali by Georgian armed forces during the night of August 7 –8, 2008, and concludes that all parties involved had failed to fulfill their international obligations in the aftermath of the attack.

The report analyzes military actions by Russia and Georgia separately. It begins by considering whether Georgia's initial shelling of Tskhinvali was in accordance with international law. The report concludes that the attack was not justifiable under international law, even if Georgia's claim of Russia's imminent attack was correct, because an “armed response would have to be both necessary and proportional.” The report then explains that since the initial attack against South Ossetian forces was illegal under international law, the subsequent counterattack against Georgian forces “did conform to international law in terms of legitimate self-defence.” But, applying the same principle of necessity and proportionality, the report adds that “any operations of South Ossetian forces outside of the purpose of repelling the Georgian armed attack, in particular acts perpetrated against ethnic Georgians inside and outside South Ossetia, must be considered as having violated International Humanitarian Law and in many cases also Human Rights Law.” The report indicates that the lack of “an ongoing armed attack by Russia before the start of the Georgian operation” meant that Georgia's initial attack —using force against Russian peacekeeping forces on Georgian territory—was not justified.

In considering Russia's military actions, the report uses a different analysis. It notes that Russia's “immediate reaction in order to defend Russian peacekeepers” was legal so long as it was proportionate. However, with respect to Russia's subsequent “military campaign deeper into Georgia,” the report concludes “that much of the Russian military action went far beyond the reasonable limits of defence.”

It follows . . . that insofar as such extended Russian military action reaching out into Georgia was conducted in violation of international law, Georgian military forces were acting in legitimate self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In a matter of a very few days, the pattern of legitimate and illegitimate military action had thus turned around between the two main actors Georgia and Russia.

The remainder of the report deals with the questions of whether the use of force by Russia was justified as a “humanitarian intervention” and whether Russia was obligated to use military action to protect its citizens living in South Ossetia. (The report concludes that neither justification could be recognized.)

The report also briefly discusses allegations of genocide and ethnic cleansing. With respect to claims of genocide, the report states that “allegations of genocide committed by the Georgian side in the context of the August 2008 conflict and its aftermath are neither founded in law nor substantiated by factual evidence.” As to the allegations of ethnic cleansing by South Ossetian forces or irregular armed groups, the report concludes that “several elements suggest the conclusion that ethnic cleansing was indeed practised against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia both during and after the August 2008 conflict.”

For more on the Mission's report, please refer to the above document.

Source: American Association of International Law

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889 (5 October 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 5 pages)

The United Nations Security Council has unanimously adopted a resolution requesting “Member States, international and regional organisations to take further measures to improve women's participation during all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding, including by enhancing their engagement in political and economic decision-making at early stages of recovery processes.” The Council reaffirmed the importance of resolution 1325 (2000) on “women and peace and security,” requesting the Secretary General to provide periodic reports on its implementation.

The Council also condemned sexual violence against women during armed conflict, calling upon all parties to conflicts to stop such violations and set up mechanisms for the prosecution and investigations of these actions. Furthermore, the Council urged Member States and the international community to develop plans and strategies to address women's needs in post-conflict situations. Finally, the Council asked the “Secretary General to report to the Security Council within 12 months on addressing women's participation and inclusion in peacebuilding and planning in the aftermath of conflict”.

Source: American Association of International Law

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1888 (30 September 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 7 pages)

The United Nations Security Council has unanimously adopted a resolution that provides measures and mechanisms to address violence against women and children during armed conflict. In particular, the Council “decid[ed] to include specific provisions . . . for the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations.” The Security Council also expressed the intent to identify “women's protection advisers” (WPAs), to be chosen from gender and human rights experts, and has asked the Secretary General to assess “the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs” in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The Council asked the Secretary General “to appoint a Special Representative to provide coherent and strategic leadership, to work effectively to strengthen existing United Nations coordination mechanisms, and to engage in advocacy efforts . . . to address . . . sexual violence in armed conflict.” In addition, the Council requested that the Secretary General “identify and take the appropriate measures to deploy rapidly a team of experts to situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence in armed conflict.” Furthermore, the Council affirmed its aim to consider acts of sexual violence against children and women “when adopting or renewing targeting sanctions in situations of armed conflict.” Consequently, the Security Council requested that the Secretary General “present specific proposals on ways to ensure monitoring and reporting in a more effective and efficient way within the existing United Nations system on the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations”.

Source: American Association of International Law

United Nations University, Japan, Call for Applications for Upcomimg International Courses

http://www.unu.edu/ic/

Applications are due 31 January 2010. Some fellowships are available.

The United Nations University will organize the tenth regular session of its six-week UNU International Courses (UNU-IC) at UNU Centre in Tokyo, Japan, from 10 May through 18 June 2010.

The UNU-IC programme is designed for postgraduate students and young professionals (with a college or university degree) in various occupations in Japan and abroad who wish to pursue careers in international fields in public-service or private organizations, including the United Nations, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations as well as national foreign service organizations.

The courses are designed to provide analyses of global issues from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.

CORE COURSE

UN System: Pressing Issues and Sustainable Solutions

OPTIONAL COURSES

Peace and Human Rights

Global Change and Sustainability

International Development and Cooperation

Core Course: This is compulsory for all students. There shall be one lecture of 120-minute duration (60 minutes of lecture and 60 minutes of Q&A) and two sessions of tutorials of 90-minute duration per session.

http://www.unu.edu/ic/

Уточнение Военной доктрины РФ вызвано актуальными угрозами для страны

Уточнение Военной доктрины РФ, новую редакцию которой планируется подготовить для представления президенту России до конца года, вызвано актуальными опасностями и угрозами для страны, заявил секретарь Совета безопасности РФ Николай Патрушев в интервью газете "Известия", которое опубликовано в среду.

Ранее Патрушев заявил, что доктрина, по сути, не является новой разработкой, а базируется и использует положения, которые были в предыдущей. "Что касается положений о возможности применения ядерного оружия, то этот раздел Военной доктрины сформулирован в духе сохранения за Российской Федерацией статуса ядерной державы, способной осуществить ядерное сдерживание потенциальных противников от развязывания агрессии против России и ее союзников. Это является в обозримой перспективе важнейшим приоритетом нашей страны", - сказал секретарь Совета безопасности РФ.

Также, по его словам, скорректированы условия использования ядерного оружия при отражении агрессии с применением обычных средств поражения не только в крупномасштабной, но и в региональной и даже в локальной войне. "Кроме того, предусматривается вариантность возможности применения ядерного оружия в зависимости от условий обстановки и намерений вероятного противника. В критических для национальной безопасности ситуациях не исключается нанесение в том числе упреждающего (превентивного) ядерного удара по агрессору", - заявил Патрушев.

По словам Патрушева, результаты анализа военно-стратегической обстановки в мире и перспектив ее развития до 2020 года свидетельствуют о смещении акцентов от крупномасштабных военных конфликтов к локальным войнам и вооруженным конфликтам.

"Хотя не утратили своей актуальности и имевшиеся ранее военные опасности и угрозы для нашей страны. Так, не прекращается деятельность по приему новых членов в НАТО, активизируется военная деятельность блока, интенсивно проводятся учения стратегических сил США с отработкой вопросов управления применением стратегического ядерного оружия. Сохраняются такие дополнительные дестабилизирующие факторы, как тенденция распространения ядерных, химических, биологических технологий, производства оружия массового уничтожения, возрастающий уровень международного терроризма, обостряющаяся борьба за топливно-энергетические и другие сырьевые ресурсы. Не ликвидированы до конца и внутренние военные опасности, о чем свидетельствует обстановка на Северном Кавказе", - сказал Патрушев.

Таким образом, по его словам, возникли объективные условия для уточнения Военной доктрины, которая должна предполагать гибкое и своевременное реагирование на текущие и перспективные изменения военно-политической и военно-стратегической обстановки на среднесрочный период. "Определено, что Россия считает своей важнейшей задачей предотвращение и сдерживание от развязывания любых военных конфликтов. При этом сформулированы основные подходы к решению этой задачи. В то же время подчеркивается, что Россия считает правомерным применение ВС и других войск для отражения агрессии против нее или ее союзников, поддержания (восстановления) мира по решению Совета Безопасности ООН, других структур коллективной безопасности", - заявил Патрушев.

Права на данный материал принадлежат РИАНовости (14.10.2009).

При Минобороны создается центр подготовки к информационной войне

Президент Дмитрий Медведев поручил министру обороны Анатолию Сердюкову подготовить предложения по созданию центра подготовки специалистов информационного противоборства. Как сообщает GZT.RU со ссылкой на источник в военном ведомстве, министру дали месяц сроку. "Вопрос сейчас всесторонне изучается, и пока неясно, где именно появится этот центр. Решение президента было принято как одна из мер усиления информационного противоборства в интересах военных союзов, в частности, Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ). Прежде всего внимание будет уделено применению различных технологий, в том числе интернета, в интересах общественно-информационного воздействия, умения правильно парировать на негативные формулировки тех или иных СМИ", – заявил собеседник издания. Источник напомнил, что специалистов по информационному противоборству не хватало летом этого года, когда в СМИ прошли сообщения о жалобах белорусских крестьян, что военная техника портит поля. В результате программа российско-белорусских учений "Запад-2009" была серьезно сокращена. В Минобороны считают, что местным жителям недостаточно хорошо объяснили, что отклонения ракет от заданных траекторий исключаются. Генштаб еще в 90-е годы рассматривал возможность создать отдельное информационное направление, напомнил изданию бывший командующий ВДВ Георгий Шпак. Тогда эта идея не была реализована. Член Совета по внешней и оборонной политике Виталий Шлыков пояснил, что военным сейчас необходимо "оказывать противодействие" "по самому широкому кругу вопросов, начиная с качества нашей военной техники и заканчивая поведением наших солдат в разных этнокультурных сферах".

Права на данный материал принадлежат Грани.ру (8.10.2009).

Essex Human Rights Review: Call for Papers

Dear colleagues,

The Essex Human Rights Review is a student-led peer-reviewed international journal associated with the prestigious Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex. It publishes original scholarly works addressing contemporary issues and debates in human rights, and encourage submissions from a broad range of disciplines, including law, philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology and economics.

Contributions from academics, practitioners and postgraduate students are welcomed. The EHRR accepts academic articles, conference reports, book reviews and edited transcripts of interviews with key figures in the field of human rights. It also encourages the submission of short notes and commentaries on recent developments, on-going cases, current initiatives and research relevant to human rights protection.

Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis and must be in electronic form. Articles submitted to the EHRR should be original, previously unpublished material and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time.

All submissions should be in English and must adhere to the EHRR style sheet, which is available on our website at http://projects. essex.ac. uk/ehrr/Submissi onGuidelines. html

Submissions should be sent to ehrr@essex.ac. uk

Current and archived issues of the EHRR may be viewed at www.ehrr.org